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Abstract
Purpose Recent changes to medical specialty certification in
the USA have prompted the process to come under intense
scrutiny.
Methods We review the history of board certification and the
changes made to the process. As part of this review, we ex-
amine both literature and public record to examine the motives
behind the changes made. We then review the legal challenges
and changes under way tomodify the current ABMS board re-
certification process.
Results In 1917, the first board certification was a lifetime
designation, voluntary, and managed by unpaid board mem-
bers with a focus to enhance quality for patients.
Corresponding to the implementation of time-limited certifi-
cation, $55 million of physician testing fees were transferred
from the American Board of Internal Medicine to its
Foundation between 1989 and 1999. From 2000 through
2007, and additional $20.66 million were transferred from
the ABIM to its Foundation culminating in the purchase of a
$2.3 million luxury condominium in December 2007.
Conclusions Significant financial conflicts of interest for the
implementation of time-limited specialty certification exited
and continue to plague the medical profession. The specialty
boards and the organizations that created them should remove
all requirements for time-limited board certification and resort
to conventional self-selected ACGME-approved CME pro-
grams for ongoing education.
Keywords Medicine . Certification . Specialty . Physician .
Re-certification . Ethics .Medical education . Health policy
“A profession is a vocation founded upon specialized
educational training, the purpose of which is to supply
disinterested objective counsel and service to others, for
a direct and definite compensation, wholly apart from
expectation of other business gain.” [1]
Medical practice in the USA today is structured around
physician-specialists. Training and credentialing of these spe-
cialists is essentially unregulated by government. Instead, a
comprehensive private, self-appointed regulatory system has
been developed, based largely on standards created by 24
independent, tax-exempt corporations called “specialty
boards” of the American Board of Medical Specialties
(ABMS). Collectively, $374 million from US physicians
funded these specialty board organizations in 2011 [2].
Recent events have led some in the medical community to
question the legitimacy of these specialty boards to uphold
the interests of practicing physicians and their patients. This
paper will review the facts that have led to the controversy and
review solutions that are underway to improve the transparen-
cy and integrity of the specialty certification system in the
USA.
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1 The history of the specialty board: a quantitative
quest for medical education adequacy
At the beginning of the twentieth century, American medical
education was poorly standardized. Medical education re-
quirements, training, and assessment of clinical competence
varied widely among medical schools. As the number of those
practicing medicine grew, state legislatures took up the issue
of physician licensure. At the same time, physicians associa-
tions were forming in states and larger cities with the principle
focus on improving medical care. They also saw their respon-
sibility to work for issues of benefit to physicians. Therefore,
the classic conflict of interest for professional groups was
already evident, “that professionals and the professions act
with a dual motive: to provide service and to use their knowl-
edge for economic gain” [3]. Despite these efforts, much of
medical care remained of low quality, in part because educa-
tional standards in medicine were virtually non-existent.
In 1904, the American Medical Association created the
Council of Medical Education (CME) with the aim of
restructuring American medical education [4]. The CME pro-
posed a set of basic standards for medical school admission
and training. In 1908, the CME asked the Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement for Teaching (which had
been chartered in 1906 by an act of Congress) to survey
American medical education, so as to promote the CME’s
reformist agenda and hasten the elimination of medical
schools that failed to meet the CME’s standards. The president
of the Carnegie Foundation chose Abraham Flexner to con-
duct a survey of all 155 US medical schools at the time. He
published his findings and recommendations for medical
school reform in the now infamous Flexner Report [5]. This
report set the framework for our current medical education
requirements. Ultimately, only 66 medical schools remained
open and able to meet the standards for medical education
proposed by Flexner and the CME. Effective education was
recognized as the key to quality.
At the time of the Flexner report, the remaining USmedical
schools generally shunned the concept of medical specializa-
tion [6]. The rapid rise in scientific knowledge about diseases
and treatment, population growth that allowed for a concen-
tration of patients with similar diseases, and the development
of new skills and techniques among those practicing in
narrower fields of practice contributed to the rise of medical
specialization [7].
2 The first specialty board
In ophthalmology, the improved understanding of refraction
had profoundly changed ophthalmic practice so that an appar-
ently menial task originally left to opticians and jewelers be-
came of economic importance to oculists. Early in the 1900s,
oculists were organizing themselves as optometrists and were
seeking state licensure to perform refraction and other tasks.
Optometry quickly emerged as a threat to ophthalmology and
efforts were stepped up to block its acceptance in state legis-
latures [7]. Ophthalmologists realized that specialized educa-
tion was urgently needed, as well as some means of differen-
tiating those who met standards of competence through qual-
ity education from others who were less well trained. The
innovative concept of the “specialty board” to oversee training
and evaluation of physicians who desired to specialize in oph-
thalmology following medical school began to crystalize. By
1915, a joint committee of ophthalmologic societies including
the AMA drafted a report recommending the establishment of
a board “to arrange, control, and supervise examinations, to
test the preparation of those who design to enter on the special
or exclusive practice of ophthalmology.” In 1917, the first
specialty board in medicine, the American Board for
Ophthalmic Examinations, was incorporated and its name
was later changed to the American Board of Ophthalmology
in 1933 [8]. Standards for specialty boards at the time required
no government affiliation, no influence on the ability of phy-
sicians to practice their trade, and board members were to be
unpaid. “It was recognized that an authoritarian approach to
board certification, coupled with the threat of loss of licensure
and loss of income, was unlikely to be acceptable in the egal-
itarian United States” [7].
Other medical specialty organizations quickly followed
suit. In 1933, the American Board of Medical Specialties
(ABMS) was incorporated stemming from a request by the
AMA. Three years later, the American Board of Internal
Medicine (ABIM) was incorporated in 1936 in Des Moines,
Iowa, and quickly grew to the largest specialty board regulat-
ing 12 internal medicine subspecialties.
From 1941 until 1989 after graduation from medical
school and doing defined years of specialty study, physi-
cians would sit for an initial specialty board examination in
their area of expertise administered by their specialty board.
Passing the examination was sufficient for board certifica-
tion for the rest of their career. In December of 1986, “after
more than 20 years of discussion and debate,” the
American Board of Internal Medicine elected to join 17
other specialty boards by limiting the duration of validity
for all certificates it issued [9]. The rationale for this
change was that “medical information changes rapidly and
the public needs reassurance that certified internists have
maintained their skills and kept their knowledge up to date”
and “evidence that knowledge and skills of practicing de-
cay with time (albeit at variable rates)” [10]. The ABIM
also published that time-limited certification and re-
certification are “obligations of an accountable profession”
[11]. Several attempts at providing voluntary re-certification
programs for board certificate holders were met with “only
limited and declining interest” [9].
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3 The new certification era: “asking, but not
requiring” renewal of certification
Faced with the reality that practicing physicians were unen-
thusiastic about re-certification, the stage was set for the
ABIM to issue an ultimatum: “diplomats would be asked,
but not required, to renew the validity of the certificates at
periodic intervals or face the uncertain consequences of loss
of their status as certified internists, subspecialists or holders
of certificates of added qualifications” [9]. This watershed
moment forever changed the landscape of specialty certifica-
tion from one that primarily served the needs of practicing
physicians to one that threatened “uncertain consequences”
and mandated additional requirements designed in large part
to serve the ethical views and ongoing financial needs of the
Specialty Boards. The first implementation of this policy de-
cision resulted in the deployment of the ABIM’s Continuous
Professional Development (CPD) program. This first internal
medicine re-certification examination under the new time-
limited CPD certification program was administered in 1996
to 256 participants sitting for 306 examinations in 12 subspe-
cialty areas with a 93 % overall pass rate [12]. The following
year, 867 candidates registered for CPD re-certification [12].
A relatively short time later in 2005, more requirements
were added by the ABMS for re-certification and the re-
certification program rebranded as “Maintenance of
Certification” (MOC). With MOC, a certain number of
“MOC points” had to be accrued by various performance
improvement projects and data collection exercises before a
physician could sit for his re-certification examination. Then
in 2014, the ABIM doubled the MOC points required (from
50 to 100 every 5 years) and stipulated that physicians who
did not meet the requirements of this expanded program
would be publicly labeled on a sponsored website as “not
meeting MOC requirements.” These changes occurred with
little public commentary and at a time when physicians’ clin-
ical time was already stressed by implementation of the elec-
tronic medical record, the transition of many from private
practice to employed status with larger “health care organiza-
tions,” increased quality reporting requirements, and new bill-
ing and compliance requirements. These new re-certification
mandates were conceived or overseen by ABMS-imposed
leadership officers of whom only 9 % collectively had
recertified in general medicine and 25 % had recertified in
any certified subspecialty [13].
4 Current state of specialty board certification—the
proficiency conundrum
Today, board certification of medical specialists is considered
voluntary and is not legally required in order to practice med-
icine in any jurisdiction [14]. Likewise, neither the boards nor
any other medical organization encourages health care institu-
tions to limit specialty practice to certified physicians alone
[14]. These realities notwithstanding, certification profoundly
affects physicians’ professional opportunities. Since more
than 90 % of US medical school graduates complete a period
of post-graduate training in the form of “residency,” the broad
acceptance of post-graduates to become “board certified”
gives initial certification significant impact with hospital priv-
ileges, peer and patient recognition, economic compensation,
and the standard of care [14]. The change of permanent board
certification to time-limited certification in 1990 effectively
converted the “voluntary” aspect of board certification to a
requirement to maintain hospital privileges and insurance pan-
el participation and profoundly impacts a physician’s ability to
earn a living in the event of re-certification failure. Despite this
reality, to the best of our knowledge, no study has ever been
conducted examining the psychological, economic, and em-
ployment outcomes of physicians who fail one or more re-
certification examinations.
5 The skyrocketing costs of maintenance
of certification
The cost of participating in MOC in general medicine
mushroomed 244 % (or 16.3 % per year) from $795 in 2000
[15] to $1940 in 2014 [16]. Similarly, the cost for subspecialty
re-certification grew 257% (or 17.2% per year) over the same
time period. A recent cost analysis estimated general internists
incur an average cost of $23,607 (95 % CI $5380 to $66,383)
and cardiac electrophysiologists incur an average cost of $52,
196 (95 % CI $9773 to $115,916) in total MOC costs over
10 years [17]. The view by many practicing physicians at the
time was this re-certification program did not make them bet-
ter physicians and represented poor value for their money with
unnecessary paperwork and data entry exercises. Worse yet:
many saw themselves as cramming a vast array of trivia in
their heads just to stay employed since hospitals nationwide
were increasingly incorporating time-limited “maintenance”
of board certification into their credentialing policies [18].
Nearly 23,000 physicians signed a petition to revoke the
changes made to the MOC program [19].
No ethical practicing physician argues with the need to
remain proficient given the rapidly changing innovations in
our field. In fact, physicians deal with the rapid growth of
medical information and innovation on a daily basis. Thanks
to dramatic technological advances in information systems
and development of the worldwide web, information is avail-
able to both physicians and patients nearly instantaneously. A
physician’s training and experience in assessing the source
and evidence base for any new medical development allows
them to critically assess its applicability and appropriateness
for patients while respecting the legal liability inherent to
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incorrect judgments in this regard. So integral and common-
place are these skills for medical practice that state licensure
boards have always required proof of this commitment to
continuing medical education (CME) through the accumula-
tion of a minimum of CME credits every several years with no
serious legal judgments filed before a physician’s state license
is renewed. In this respect, the MOC re-certification program
adds little more than an additional burden to physicians’ time
and finances.
Proponents of theMOC program say its goal is to “reassure
the public that the practitioner continues professional devel-
opment and education post-training” [8]. There would have to
be compelling evidence in order to legitimize a re-certification
process that has become a prerequisite for hospital credentials
[16], time-consuming and costly [20], and has failed 13.2% of
experienced physicians in the last 15 years on their first-time
MOC examination [21]. Proponents claim the cost for the
program is “the cost of keeping up” [22]. Yet after nearly
30 years of attempting to legitimize the existence of time-
limited certification, no credible data exist that the ABMS
MOC program has led to improved patient outcomes [23,
24]. Corporate employees and subcontractors without consis-
tent disclosure of conflicts of interest generally author publi-
cations in support the ABMSMOC program [25]. Even as late
as May 12, 2013, the American Board of Pathology offered
ABMS Board re-certification for nothing more than a cash
payment of $1000 in lieu of any other requirements, including
sitting for a secure examination [26]. In addition, mainstream
media sources have identified physicians harmed by the rev-
ocation of hospital and insurance privileges after failing their
MOC examination [27]. This led the Association of American
Physicians and Surgeons to file a lawsuit on behalf of the
national membership against the ABMS in April of 2013
seeking redress on multiple issues regarding conspiracy and
restraint of trade (see United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey Docket No. 3:13-cv-2609-PGS-
LHG). The case was moved to Chicago and is currently
waiting judgment on a motion to dismiss filed by the ABMS
before the Federal District Court in Chicago (See United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
Docket No. 1:14-CV-2705) at the time of this writing. If the
ABMS, a private, insulated non-profit corporation granted tax
exempt status by the public to assure accountability of prac-
ticing physicians, then practicing physicians and the public
have every right to demand the same from the ABMS and
its member boards.
Other “accountable” professions (like airline pilots and
lawyers) do not require a “maintenance of certification” pro-
gram to assure public safety or welfare. In the case of pilots,
after being granted a flight certificate by the Federal Aviation
Administration, with the exception of student and some tem-
porary issue certifications, pilot certificates do not expire, al-
though they may be suspended or revoked [28]. However,
pilots are required to maintain their respective ratings by pass-
ing rigorous flight reviews with a qualified instructor every
2 years. Likewise, lawyers certified by the American Bar
Association in specialized fields of law only need to document
their experience in their respective field, provide peer letters,
and self-report 30 hours of continuing legal education (CLE)
credits and in most states, CLE participation is self-reported
[29].
6 The ABIM Foundation and the $2.3 million
condominium
While the ABIM, a member board of the ABMS, consistently
stresses the importance of physician accountability with the
public, there is a strong case to be made that the ABIM has not
been accountable to its physician members and the public. The
ABIM receives 98 % of its revenues from physician testing
fees [30]. On October 17, 1989 and just before implementa-
tion of time-limited certification, the ABIM quietly registered
the “ABIM Foundation” corporation in Pennsylvania [31],
and the “American Board of Internal Medicine Foundation”
was granted non-profit status with the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) in 1990 [32]. From 1989 to 1999, monetary
transfers were made from the ABIM to the “American
Board of Internal Medicine Foundation.” To the best of our
knowledge, no public disclosure of these monetary transfers
ever occurred to the practicing physician community or ABIM
diplomats. By June 30, 1999, the “American Board of Internal
Medicine Foundation” had accrued over $59.6 million in as-
sets from physician testing fees [33]. Only after an ABIM-
requested IRS administrative name change from the
“American Board of Internal Medicine Foundation” to the
“ABIM Foundation” on March 26, 1999 [34] was this addi-
tional ABIM organization, the “ABIMFoundation,” disclosed
publicly. In fact, until as late as November 27, 2014, the ABIM
Foundation “About Us” webpage still indicated the organiza-
tionwas created in 1999 [35]. Additionally, ABIM Foundation
IRS Form 990 tax forms filed from 2008 through 2012 indi-
cated only that organization was formed in 1999 in Iowa (like
the ABIM), not in Pennsylvania as disclosed in public record,
further obfuscating the origin of the Foundation.
With its prolific balance sheet obtained from practicing
physician diplomats and for clinical reasons that remain un-
clear, the ABIM Foundation leadership felt compelled to or-
ganize a “Task Force” to define and promote the concept of
“medical professionalism” in 1999. This definition was ulti-
mately published simultaneously as a white paper in the
Annals of Internal Medicine and The Lancet and included a
cost-saving “social justice” imperative for physicians [36, 37].
The ABIM continued to issue grants from 2000 to 2007 total-
ing $20.66 million to their Foundation [38] culminating in the
purchase of a $2.3 million luxury condominium complete
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with a chauffeur-driven Mercedes S-class town car by the
Foundation in December 2007 [39]. According to tax records,
exclusive meeting venues for the ABIM included such loca-
tions as the Ritz-Carlton, Laguna Niguel in California and the
Four Seasons Hotel, Philadelphia. Ironically, in 2011, the
ABIM Foundation’s “Choosing Wisely©” campaign was
launched to promote cost savings in health care. With this
program, the Foundation partners with some 70 societies
and some non-physician organizations, including Consumer
Reports. As part of the campaign, the ABIM Foundation
awarded monetary grants sponsored, in part, by the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation and physician fees to third parties
willing to “educate practicing physicians.” Meanwhile, by
June 30, 2014, the ABIM’s own IRS Form 990 balance sheet
showed its net assets or fund balances had dwindled to negative
$47,886,854 (Line 22), balanced by a promise of $94,075,214
(page 12 of 2013 Form 990) in “deferred income.” [40]
Where, then, is the “deferred revenue” for the ABIM to
materialize from? It appears the promise to repay the ABIM
comes from physician testing fees in future years and the
cementing of the ABMS as a physician quality registry and
its MOC program into the Affordable Care Act [41]. To entice
physician enrollment in the ABMS MOC program, taxpayer-
funded physician payment incentives were issued from 2011
to 2014 by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
[42]. Tax disclosures suggest the ABIM had long-term undis-
closed lobbying efforts with Congress from at least 2009 to
2014 as confirmed by the Center for Responsive Politics [43].
The extent of government agency lobbying to financially ben-
efit the ABIM and ABMS are unknown. But after disclosure
of this lobbying relationship by mainstream media [44] and a
physician’s personal weblog [43], the ABIM’s long-standing
relationship with its lobbying firm was terminated June 30,
2015 [45]. Ironically, despite these many deceptive practices,
the ABIM felt compelled to sanction 139 practicing physi-
cians for “ethical violations” in June of 2010 because of
threats to their intellectual property [46].
7 The early corrections
Fortunately, the public disclosure of these facts has already
created a much-needed correction to the unproven ABMS
MOC re-certification program conducted by the ABIM, both
within the organization and from its subsidiary subspecialty
boards and specialty medical societies.
Within the ABIM, numerous steps were taken to “trans-
form” MOC from its 2014 iteration. First, there was a public
apology that “we got it wrong” [47]. Conventional CME
credits were allowed to “count” for MOC points, website
reporting will change to “participating in MOC” rather than
“meeting MOC requirements,” a 2-year suspension of the
Practice Assessment, “Patient Voice,” and Patient Safety
requirements for the MOC program were made and the fees
for the program capped through 2017. Unfortunately, none of
these addressed the public concerns of the financial actions of
the organization.
8 The specialty society response
In response to the current ethical, procedural, and financial
practices of the ABIM, a new board, National Board of
Physicians and Surgeons (NBPAS), spearheaded by Paul
Teirstein, MD, was launched as an alternative pathway for
re-certification purposes [48]. Only a first ABIM certification
and proof of 50 hours of credible CME within the prior
24 months are required to “maintain” certification with
NBPAS. So far, 18 hospitals have agreed to accept this re-
certification credential [48]. The costs for re-certification are
a fraction of the ABMSMOC program and at the present time
Board members of the NBPAS are unpaid.
Other professional societies are moving to modify the
ABMS MOC program or alter it completely. The American
Board of Anesthesiology is proposing completion of a
trademarked “MOCA Minute™” interactive “learning tool”
study questions weekly in lieu of performing the “MOCA
Part 3 secure examinat ion” [49] . The American
Gastroenterological Society is petitioning the ABIM to re-
move the MOC requirement for gastroenterologists in favor
of their Gastroenterologist: Accountable Professionalism in
Practice (G-APP) program [50]. While other subspecialty
boards are likely to follow, the cost of participation for these
unproven programs, the many conflicts of interest that exist
with the ABMS Specialty Boards, and the true value of re-
certification to physicians and patient care remain unproven.
9 Conclusions
The level of vetting for established physicians to earn their
medical degree and initial subspecialty certification is exten-
sive and the sum of the entities scrutinizing their individual
behavior is comprehensive and redundant: State Medical
Boards, the Drug Enforcement Agency, hospital Medical
Executive Boards, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services billing data, third party payers, individual subspecial-
ty organizations, county medical organizations and the like.
Couple this with the additional levels of scrutiny from main-
stream media outlets, “Big Data” access, claims-based data
analysis, Google searches, and Yelp reviews available via a
smartphone or a laptop. This mix of data and profiling may
serve to keep the medical field open and honest at least as well
as a series of expensive multiple-choice examinations.
So the questions become these: if the federal, state, and
local governments, hospitals, individual subspecialty
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societies, lay press, social media, tort system, and medical
insurance companies all direct physician behavior, what ex-
actly is the ABIM trying to regulate that isn’t already being
regulated? Where is the evidence that the costly and time-
consuming re-certification system improves patient care?
If one asks the question, “should the ABIM (or any ABMS
member board) be the sole arbiter and regulator of ‘re-certifi-
cation’” when many of us recognize that this role is already
filled and the answer is a resounding “no,” then this debate is
over. The ABMS and their member boards have lost their way,
especially in regards to the costs and proof of the value of their
MOC re-certification program. They have also lost the trust of
the practicing physician community. While it is encouraging
to practicing physicians that changes are underway, time will
tell if the lucrative Specialty Board system in the USA can
withstand the significant ongoing legal challenges and adapt
to a more transparent, economic, and practical system that
returns to serving the needs to today’s practicing physician
community and their patients, rather than themselves. It is fair
to say that significant financial conflicts of interest existed for
the implementation of time-limited specialty certification and
these continue to plague the U.S.-based ABMS Specialty
Board system’s credibility. To rectify the situation and restore
trust among practicing physicians and their patients, the spe-
cialty boards and the organizations that created them should
remove all requirements for time-limited board certification
and resort to conventional self-selected ACGME-approved
CME programs for ongoing professional education.
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